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Based on analyzing two different areas of research about regulation of technologies, 
which are the literature of innovation and regulation on the one hand, and risk and 
governance on the other hand; the present study suggests that there are some conceptual 
gaps in the policy literature. Using the case of GM foods regulation in the context of 
European Union, it will show some limitations of both streams. As a initial proposed 
framework for policy analysis as well as policy making, it shall suggest a new conceptual 
model that is supposed to be richer than the previous versions.  
 
                                                 
1 I must be so thankful for what I have learned from Prof. Erik Millstone during my staying at SPRU 
this topic and also his kind recommendations on this paper.  
Introduction: 
The filed of innovation studies as a multi and some how an interdisciplinary area2, 
mostly has tried to understand “how innovations occur” (Fagerberg 2005). After the 
Second World War, and in light of some questions mainly in studies relating to the 
growth issue, some scholars began to investigate the mechanisms behind the new 
technological changes (Martin and Nightingale 2000). The problems of the production 
function (Solow 1956, 1957) in explaining the forces behind technical change 
(Abramovitz 1956) raised the central question of the field to investigate the inside of 
what has been called the black box (Rosenberg 1963, 1982).  
This stream of research, however, always has had some elements of government 
intervention for its potential role in promoting the conditions for innovation. From the 
Bush's (1945) report on the main role of government in supporting basic research for 
the sake of economic growth, health and security to famous papers of Nelson (1959) and 
Arrow (1962) which have suggested the government intervention in science production 
because of the market failure until the current evolutionary (Nelson and Winter 1982) 
and systemic (Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1988, 1992, Nelson 1993) understandings of 
innovation and technological progress emphasizing on the role of governments in 
institutional setups and capability building; all scholars were trying to find out how 
governments could take an active role in promoting innovation and learning, than a 
passive laissez faire version of letting market to do what it can as the best mechanism of 
economic administration.  
Regulation of technologies as social constructs, especially new and emerging 
technologies, is among the different functions, which has been suggested for 
government’s interventions. In the words of Rothwell (1992), it traced back initially to 
the increasing public awareness of the negative impacts of unrestrained industrialization 
in the mid-1960s such as health and safety problems in the workplaces and degradation 
of the physical environment (p. 447). Although the energy crisis of 1973-1974 led to the 
new deregulation for improving industrial innovation; widespread concerns about 
different externalities of technological progress renewed pressures for tighter control 
through more stringent government regulations (p. 448).  
As a result, in this field of inquiry scholars began to explore the impacts of regulation on 
innovation (Allen et al. 1978) considering regulation as an environmental factor that 
must be overcame by firms, and somehow modeling the dynamics of interaction 
between regulation and innovation helping to explore the conditions under which the 
firm would be more likely to innovate (e.g. Montalvo 2007) and finding the ways in 
                                                 
2 Both of multi and inter disciplinary approaches are investigating a topic. The difference is that in the 
former “there exist many disciplines… each of which has a particular way or several ways of 
examining the topic”; while the latter “holds that characteristics of the subject matter require a method 
that is unique to that topic” (Bowden 1995 p. 68). In the other words, in understanding a topic, firstly 
different disciplines come in to investigate it based on their methodologies and after some learning 
among them, they begin to develop some unified and integrated approaches which is called 
interdisciplinary.  
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which regulations pose minimal barriers for innovations presumes that the ways of 
regulations is important in shaping innovations, rather than their existence per see 
(Rothwell 1992 p. 448). Plausibly, these studies are concerning about the benefits of 
new technological progresses, rather than their potential risks and disbenefits, or 
possible harms.  
On the other side, there are vast and widespread studies concerning the regulation of 
and management of risks, especially arising from new technological advances in some 
fields such as GM foods (e.g. look at the 2nd issue of the Journal of Risk Research in 
2000), Nano technologies and so on. Different scholars based on different philosophical 
assumptions have worked on the ways governments can regulate new technologies 
considering their risks and possible harm effects as the major issue that must be tackled 
by governments.  
Hence; while Rothwell has defined regulation as “the control of particular situation for 
the benefit of society” and “stimulation of technological innovation”(p. 451), Jasanoff 
(1995) introduces a new view to the regulation as “a kind of contract that specifies the 
terms under which state and society agree to accept the costs, risks and benefits of a 
given technological enterprise”(p. 311). Apparently, two major differences between 
these views must be taken into account which are 1) emphasizing on the costs and risks 
of technologies in addition of their benefits and 2) the importance of a kind of 
democratization of regulation in which it is not a mere control by government, but a 
participatory method in which society plays its role and therefore must accept the terms 
of its resulted contract. In this situation “most hazardous technologies confer substantial 
benefits on society in the form of better health, increased productivity, and in general a 
higher quality of life” (Jasanoff 1986 p. v).  
The present paper argues that there is a gap in the literature to encompass the new 
developments in the regulation of technologies mostly in the new high tech fields such as 
biotechnology. It will argue that considering the new developments in the studies 
concerning risks and sustainable development would yield a new and richer 
understanding of the regulatory environment of technologies.  
It will argue that one of the main assumptions in the innovation studies is not true for 
the case of GM foods regulation and changing this assumption will lead to changing the 
whole policy making approach, and therefore a need for new analytical tools. This 
assumption which briefly described before is taking for granted the importance of 
innovation and trying to find the ways in which regulation pose minimal barriers for 
innovation.  
It will accept the case of regulating GM foods as an example in which the real problem is 
not concealing the regulation for the sake of promoting innovation, but wider and 
broader issues in a democratic process of regulation. The new forms of regulation in the 
E.U. such as precautionary approach might be seen as the consequence of paying more 
attentions to risks than benefits of technologies, or at least being aware of the high 
uncertainties around those technologies.  
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Conceptually, there is no analytical tool in the hands of governments and policy makers 
for making balances and deciding about new technologies consisting both risks and 
benefits simultaneously. The current monograph hopes to contribute in this respect 
using the models developed for regulation in the situation of risks and modify them to 
can consider the framing assumptions of both risks and benefits and therefore pave the 
way for sounder policy decisions in a more explicit manner.  
In the following sections, the paper tries to highlight this policy gap by illustrating the 
literature of regulation from innovation studies in the next part and then the risk 
regulations in the third section. The fourth section tries to identify the characteristics of 
both strands and the limitations of each of them to can provide an analytical policy tool 
for government’s regulatory decisions. This part suggests a new conceptual framework 
for decision making based on the capabilities of both trends, which can be used also as an 
analytical tool for policy analysis.  
Innovation studies of regulation:  
In this part, first of all some general theoretical insights in the field of innovation studies 
shall be presented which are seen as rationales for policy interventions. Then, it shall 
illustrate the studies concerning regulation, as a part of innovation policies, which 
mostly have been done by scholars in the field of innovation studies. As it will be 
discussed in this section, one of the most important assumptions behind those studies is 
accepting the importance of innovation as a determining factor for the progress of a 
society and finding the ways that regulations do not make major barriers for the 
innovation processes. In the selection of the below works, I shall try to discuss works of 
some famous scholars as the leaders of the innovation studies filed.  
STI Policy Rationales: 
Overall it is possible to count 7 rationales for the government intervention in the 
science, technology and innovation area. The changing rationale of STI policy could be 
traced in moving from neo-classical school to the evolutionary theory of economics 
(Borras and Lundvall 1997). The neo-classical approach based on the market failure 
(Nelson 1959 and Arrow 1962) prescribes the intervention of government just when the 
market mechanism fails to operate properly. 
For science, an argument is that the costless transformation characteristic of science 
would prevent firms to appropriate the full benefits of their R&D. Subsequently, they 
under-invest in its production (Arrow 1962). In terms of technology, its intrinsic 
uncertainty restrains obtaining the Pareto optimal point (Metcalfe 1994, 1995). In both 
situations, there is a need for government intervention. Moreover, the capability of 
government to handle the situation is another illustrated point (Edquist 2001 p.220): 
“Two conditions must be fulfilled for there to be reasons for public intervention in a 
market economy: 
1. The market mechanism and capitalist actors must fail to achieve the objectives 
formulated; a problem must exist 
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2. The state (national, regional, local) and its public agencies must also have the 
ability to solve or mitigate the problem”. 
The rival of this simple justification of policy is the complicated Neo-Schumpeterian 
rationales for STI policy. Based on the evolutionary theory of economic growth (Nelson 
and Winter 1982) and the systemic approach to the innovation including institutions 
(e.g. Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1988) there are very complicated discussions about STI 
policy rationales. I have summarized the rationales in three categories that in spite of 
their overlaps; it seems they are insightful. The first category includes rationales 
stemmed from innovation system approach. Second category refers to the rationales 
which come from evolutionary economics and the last one is the result of other 
innovation studies. 
Innovation system rationales could be divided into arguments that either point out to the 
importance of institutions or the systemic role of actors. The former argues that while 
markets play a very important role in innovation, they exist in the context of social 
institutions that might be more fruitful targets of policy intervention (Lundvall 1992). 
Different studies show that many non economic factors, such as social, might be 
dominant in shaping the innovation (Hughes 1987). The latter claims that firms are not 
innovating in isolation, instead they are interacting with different actors and their 
systemic relationships defines the success of innovation (Edquist 2005) 
The evolutionary theory also has some implications for STI policy. It means that the 
steady state equilibrium does not exist through continues change of the economy 
(Edquist 2001). “A distinctive feature of the evolutionary approach is its adoption of a 
behavioral theory of the firm and its focus upon learning processes and adaptive 
behavior” (Metcalfe 1994). While the principle of evolutionary theory is twofold: 
variety and selection; the aim of technology policy is also twofold: to stimulate the 
generation of variety and to prevent the dominance of one technology due to the 
selection mechanism (Smith 1991). Accepting the importance of firms’ behavior, 
technology policy is defined: “as policies that are intended to influence the decisions of 
firms to develop, commercialize or adopt new technologies” (Mowery 1995). 
The innovation studies, as the source of the last category, have highlighted some aspects 
of innovation, chief among them are the uncertain nature of innovative activities (e.g. 
Nelson and Winter 1977), the cumulative and path dependency characteristics of 
technical knowledge (e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982 on technological trajectories or Dosi 
1982 on technological paradigms) and the importance of scientific knowledge in the 
innovation of firms (e.g. Dosi 1988). 
The summary of these rationales are as follows:  
1. There are many institutions in shaping the innovation, rather than market that 
might be very important in policy making. Their role and importance could be 
different in relation to the science, technology and innovation. 
2. Innovation is a systemic phenomenon that many actors are playing in it. Similar 
to the innovation that its success depends on a coordinated system of actors, 
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scientific and technological achievements are also be determined by a good 
arranged system. 
3. Firms are the most important actors in the innovation process that their learning 
behavior is a target of policy. While technology and innovation take the high 
values to firms, science might hesitate to do the same. 
4. The selection mechanism may lead to domination of one form of technology. 
The role of policy could be breaking the paradigm through providing some new 
opportunities. This situation due to the differences between science and 
technology is highly related to the technology, not the science. 
5. Innovation and technology are highly uncertain and diverse. A role of 
government could be reducing these uncertainties through some policy tools. 
These uncertainties means that many technological developments need time to 
change the reality, to find the value of their conjectures; nevertheless, science 
does not need this time, because its reality is available. 
6. The cumulative and path dependent learning is the main driver of many 
innovations. Government should be care about this issue either to prevent the 
cumulativeness of technological knowledge in particular firms; or to promote 
the monopoly in the market to increase its international competitiveness. In 
terms of science, there is a general agreement for the need of distributing 
knowledge not only in the universities; but also throughout the society (the issue 
of public understanding of science). 
7. Scientific knowledge is very important in many innovations that lead to 
considering the role of science in innovation. As a result, government should 
consider the relationships between science and technology and facilitate the 
needed interactions between them. 
Based on these insights, different scholars discussed the role and impacts of regulation 
on innovation which will be presented below. The discussion of these studies shows that 
they are mostly based on one important assumption which is the eminent importance of 
innovation as a priority for the policy making, especially in the advanced countries. In 
this framework, regulation is one of the government tools in promoting innovation for 
the sake of increasing the rate of growth, or other similar aims.  
Studies of regulation: 
Utterback with some of his colleagues in 1978 ran a research study investigating the 
impacts of regulation on innovation in five different industries between five different 
countries (Allen et al 1978). Their study presupposed regulation would affect the firm’s 
environment, which is a determining factor in their innovation performance. The result 
of their research showed no indication of the impacts of government’s intervention on 
success or failure of those innovation projects. They concluded that technologically 
innovative firms have been relatively successful in coping with government regulation.  
Though this study was empirical in nature; however it tried to shed more light on the 
effects of regulation on innovation emphasizing on the ways firms react in response to 
the different regulatory signals. Consequently, they did not try to provide new 
understandings about the good versus bad, or constructive versus non- constructive 
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modes of regulations; instead the regulatory framework has been taken for granted as a 
situational condition, or a constant that would affect the innovative behavior of firms. 
However, it might be clear that the major concern of this study is to find the impacts of 
regulation on innovation as the core of economic activities emphasizing on the firms as 
the central actor of that game, and finally concluded that technology has been successful 
in coping with regulation.   
The effect of 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
on the firms research and development strategies and behaviors has been discussed by 
Schnee (1979) to highlight the adverse effects of this regulation on innovation. The 
amendment “had two major objectives: (1): closer control over the premarket testing of 
new drugs, and (2) alteration of the criteria for the approval to market new drugs” (p. 
366). The paper discussed how this amendment increased the costs of R&D, lowered 
the innovative outputs of firms as the principal dysfunctional consequence of the 1962 
legislation, and changed the activities from research to the development and finally 
eroding the world wide technological leadership of the U.S. firms. Like the previous 
study, also this work did not suggest any policy improvements for helping the firms’ 
innovative behaviors; though it is clear that the paper sounds its support showing the 
new R&D problems of firms stemmed from the new regulation.   
In a study of innovation among firms in the food sector, Ettlie (1983) found that the 
government intervention in the sector tends to discourage innovation and therefore 
there is a need for some policy improvements. He suggested seven national science and 
technology policy recommendations for changing the role of government from a 
discourager to encourager of innovation in that sector. The general framework that he 
used is similar to Utterback conceived context influences the form and long rage plans 
of organizations that in turn will affect its capability and inclination to innovate. It is 
plausible to realize that this study tried to found the regulatory effects on the innovation 
behavior of firms and the possible ways of changing the regulatory framework to can 
promote innovation.  
Patel and Pavitt (1987) compared the policy challenges of Japan, USA and W. Europe in 
increasing the technological levels concluding that the main policy challenges of W. 
Europe are to increase the rate of growth of innovative activities in lagging countries. 
Among particular policy problems of W. Europe, the effects of social legislation on 
worker flexibility and mobility, the problem of national regulations on intra-European 
competition are worth noting. While this study did not consider the effect of national 
policies as a contextual factor on the firms’ activities; however it taken for granted the 
high value and importance of innovation and the ways that policy must help to increase 
the rate of growth through innovative processes.  
Although at the end of paper they admitted that any “policy implications of technology 
should be based on a fully worked out theory”, but because “there exists no satisfactory 
theory”, they assumed “that it is welfare inefficient for an OECD country or region to be 
behind the world technological frontier” (p. 78) as the basis for their policy 
recommendations. This assumption emphasizes on the importance of technological 
improvements, or progress, as the basis for policy makings in, at least, OECD countries. 
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Therefore, the real policy problem would be how it is possible to increase, or enhance 
the innovative performance to can reach the world class technological capabilities.  
While the high rate of regulations in the mid-1960s decreased after the energy crisis of 
1973-1974, new concerns about pollution, global warming and other issues caused 
increasing the government interventions in regulating technologies. Rothwell (1992) 
discussed the lessons from past experiences of the negative impacts of regulations on 
firms to can suggest how is it possible to minimize the negative effects of environmental 
regulations; while at the same time offering adequate protection to the environment. In 
his discussion, Rothwell concluded “it was often not regulation per se which caused the 
greatest problems, but rather the way in which specific regulations were formulated and 
implemented, for example: 
• Unrealistic regulations; 
• Lack of clarity and precision in regulations; 
• Lack of a proper scientific basis for regulations; 
• … (p. 455).  
From the aim of his study, which is minimizing the negative impacts of environmental 
regulations, and its definition of regulation as: “the control of a particular situation for 
the benefit of society” and “stimulation of technological innovation” (p. 451), it is 
obvious that his major concern is the importance of innovation in regulations as the 
major determinant factor; an assumption nearly close to the previous mentioned works.  
Other studies in the later time also chose a similar approach to regulation. Thomas 
(1994) based on the organizational economics theory of the firm, explained how the 
regulatory framework of the U.K. led the British firms into international 
competitiveness; while the French system persuaded its firms to focus on a protected 
local market away from worldwide industry. Lanjouw and Mody (1996) described the 
effects of environmental regulatory acts over the 1970s and 1980s on the direction of 
innovations and environmental patents. They argued on the positive effects of this 
regulation on changing the motivations for innovations concerning abating pollutions, 
which served as focusing devices for motivating innovations.  
Bourreau and Dogan (2001) analyzed the relationships between regulation and 
innovation in the telecommunications industry to find out which regulatory systems are 
likely to promote innovation in a fast-growing telecommunications industry. Similarly 
and in a more comprehensive study, Buhrlen et al (2003) analyzed the impacts of 
regulation on the innovation in the E.U. pharmaceutical sector. Based on a behavioral 
approach, Montalvo (2007) tried to present a dynamic model of interaction between 
regulators and firms, which seems to be able in exploring the conditions under which 
firm would be more likely to innovate.  
To sum up, the above inspection of the literature concerning regulation shows that 
many commentators saw innovation at a core activity, while regulation and its other 
related factors in an ancillary role. Thereby, their major concerns would be how is it 
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possible to regulate technologies in a way that has the minimal effects on the innovative 
outputs of economy. The next section, which wants to illustrate the case of GM policy 
making, especially in the context of Europe, aims to show that this assumption is not 
accurate in some real policy situations and therefore the suggested models and 
approaches are not able to analyze and explain those policy situations. As a result, there 
is a need for richer models to can consist more factors relating risks and uncertainties as 
well as increased democratic methods of regulation.  
Risk and policy making: 
In this section, I shall try to illustrate the new developments in policy and regulation 
facing risks and uncertainties, which are mainly the products of 1990s renewed concerns 
about risk and risk society. Below I shall present the conceptual developments of the 
models in the field following by real policy problems in the case of GM foods, 
particularly at the E.U. Those developments are come from studying the role of science 
in policy making, particularly when science is obliged to provide the reliable 
information about the risks of new technologies.   
Conceptual developments: 
It is largely believed that in the late twentieth century, industrial societies are 
confronting risk and uncertainty as a dominant issue. Jasanoff (1986) has noted that: 
“avoiding risk is a central preoccupation of our age. We are haunted daily by risks of 
varying probability, magnitude, and emotive impact: dioxin in the air, thrihalomethanes 
in the drinking water, pesticides on our food, drunken drivers on the highways…” (p. 
1).  
These concerns, among other factors, provide a circumstance for scientists and scientific 
organizations to play important roles in policy making “as advocates of support, 
purveyors of advice, and in struggles over many policy goals” (Lakoff 2001). Especially 
concerning the regulation of risks and uncertainties, science found an eminent position 
as Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) noted: “science was previously understood as achieving 
even greater certainty in our knowledge and control of the natural world; now it is seen 
as coping with increasing uncertainties” (p 7). 
Intriguingly, Abraham (1993) described the initiation of using science in coping with 
risks and uncertainties:  
“Risk assessment developed initially as a 'scientistic" response by industry, especially the nuclear 
industry, to the perceptions of environmentalist and consumer movements in the 1960s that many 
industrial technologies posed undesirable and unacceptable risks to (certain sections of) Society. In a 
similar vein, the strategy adopted by government was to rely on scientists to define risks, as a way of 
providing a rational basis for technology policy decisions which entailed some perceived societal 
hazards” (p. 387).  
Van Zwanenberg and Millstone (2005) called this approach to regulation as ‘inverted 
decisionist’ model which is depicted in figure 1. The basic assumption of this model is 
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that science, in the initial phase, is capable of identifying the risks and uncertainties of 
new technologies far from any social, or external, forces as well as any internal biases. 
Therefore, it will provide a sound basis for policy makers to decide based upon that 
information, to accept or reject the risks and uncertainties.  
 
Figure 1. The inverted decisionism model (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005, p. 20) 
The ‘revised inverted decisonist’ model or what has been called also the ‘red book’ 
model3, is another suggestion based on different terminologies and consists of two 
stages processes: ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk management’. According to this model, it is 
necessary to separate the risk assessment phase carrying out by science and scientific 
expertise from risk management stage which is in the context of socio-political factors. 
As figure 2 shows, the model assumes that risk assessment is not affecting by those 
contextual factors, or to say, scientific arguments are not exposed to the influence of 
external sources.  
The ‘revised inverted decisionist’ model supposes the scientific risk assessment as the 
pure source of identifying the risk and uncertainties arising from new technologies and 
products. The core assumption of this model is that risk assessment is based on mere 
science and scientific considerations apart from social, political and cultural context. But 
it consider a place for policy makers in that contexts to decide about the result of risk 
assessment in the regulatory process such as selecting the identified risks as acceptable or 
unacceptable. This model largely implemented and used in the U.S. in the final decades 
of the 20th century.  
                                                 
3 Based on the report published by National Research Council in 1983: risk assessment in the Federal 




Figure 2. Revised inverted decisionist model (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005 p.15) 
However, a vast corpus of studies mostly based on a social constructivist views, joint by 
realizing the real outputs of using science in policy making led to fundamental suspicions 
on some assumptions of this model, chief among them the separation of science from its 
external socio-political contexts. The seminal paper of Weinberg (1972) pointed out the 
‘trans-scientific’ matters; “questions of fact and can be stated in the language of science, 
they are unanswerable by science; they transcend science” (p. 209). 
Different persons based on various assumptions questioned the role of science in policy 
making as the mere source of assessing the risks. Jasanoff (1990) did a review of the 
literatures on science and policy which showed different problematic aspects of using 
science in political contexts. They argued that while it is supposed science can provide 
the realistic information for the decision of policy makers; their real case studies did not 
confirm this position. In many instances, the outputs of scientific works are impregnated 
with other socio-political cultures which are not seen in those models.  
Funtowicz and Calenbuhr (1999) in their prologue on Andy Stirling’s (1999) synthetic 
report about precautionary approach of the E.U. described the evolution of policy 
making processes concerning to use of science:  
"The use of sophisticated scientific methods in the assessment and then management of risks began 
with the problems of major industrial hazards, notably those of nuclear power. At first it was 
believed that quantitative techniques, either of statistics or of modeling, would suffice for the 
guidance of risk policy and risk management. But as experience accumulated, it became clear that 
while science is an essential core of the assessment process, it could not be the whole." 
In this environment, some scholars based on social constructivist view argued that all of 
those cases are signs confirming the strength of their view that science is a social 
construct far from realizing the truth, or even providing reliable knowledge (Van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone 2000). Jasanoff (1986) in seeking for an explanation of why 
countries made distinct regulations concerning the risk of chemical products for human 
health and possible cancer; attributed it to the different ways their risk assessment and 
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management are constructed. She also (1995) traced the source of disparities among 
U.S, U.K and Germany in biotech regulation in their socio-cultural traditions. 
On the contrary, some scholars based on realist constructivist views attributed the 
problem to some framing assumptions behind scientific inquiries, or risk assessments, 
rather than problems in nature of science as a social construct. In a model which is called 
co-evolutionary model, Van Zwanenberg and Millstone (2005) put the science in the 
socio-political context which impose some framing assumptions about risks of 
technologies and might be the major source of differences between countries (Millstone 
et al 2004). As figure 3 shows, this does not mean that science would or could not have 
any useful input for policy making decisions; though it is based on non-scientific framing 
assumptions. For instance, governments can frame the scope of research by changing the 
range of phenomena that scientists must include in their research (for instance, the 
scope of risk must be confined just to environment or encompass both environment and 
human’s health?); or deciding about which kinds of disciplinary specialties to be used in 
the assessments, the kind of evidences to be accepted as direct or indirect and so on.  
 
More on framing 
The concept of framing assumptions is a central theme in analysis of risk assessment in 
regulatory policy making. The concept refers to the various ways and possibilities that 
non scientific factors would affect scientific dealings with assessing risks and 
uncertainties. Both Van Zwanenberg & Millstone (2005) and Jasanoff (2005) noted that 
the concept of framing assumption is the result of Erving Goffman (1974) sociological 
works to “characterize the implicit underlying features of the world view of individuals 
or social groups” (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005 p. 29) which “fundamentally 
alter people’s perceptions of what is real in the world around them” (Jasanoff 2005 p. 
24).  
 
Figure 3. The realistic co-evolutionary model (from Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005, p. 29) 
In the realist constructivist perspectives, framing which refers largely to what may be 
called the ‘meta-level’ of food safety governance (Dreyer et al 2008), describes the 
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process within which governments define the questions to be asked and the issues to be 
taken into account by scientific advisors and regulators (Ely 2006). According to this 
approach, framing assumption refers to both underlying beliefs about the world and a 
broader set of conditions that influence the production of scientific claims and results 
(Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005).  
In some studies, realistic scholars have suggested that sources of disputes and 
disagreements between countries in some cases was neither the differences between 
their scientific conjectures nor the erosion of public trust in policy makers; but the 
differences in their up-stream framing assumptions. For instance, Millstone et al (2004) 
have found the sources of trade disputes between U.S and E.U in their contrasted 
framing assumptions or Millstone et al (2008) argued differences between U.S., U.K, 
Germany, Japan and Argentina are attributable to their various framing assumptions. 
Millstone et al (2004) added the importance of framing assumptions as the ‘risk 
assessment policy’ stage in the model called it ‘transparent model’. As figure 4 shows, 
risk assessment policy is affected by socio-economic and political considerations which 
in turn provide inputs for the risk assessment stage which needs also scientific 
considerations. This model is the revised version of the ‘red book’ model including the 
framing assumptions. They divided the framing assumptions into ‘upstream’ and 
‘downstream’ ones in which upstream framing assumptions are those before the risk 
assessment stage as socio-economic and political considerations; while the downstream 
ones are after risk assessment step, as the technical, economic and social considerations 
affecting risk evaluation and management.  
  
Figure 4. The transparent model of regulation (Millstone et al 2004) 
Conceptually, one clear difference between these models and those developed and 
suggested in the innovation studies is that the former put the emphasis on the risks of 
technologies; while the latter pointing to the critical importance of benefits as the major 
mean of economic growth and welfare. Needless to say, both of them are composed of 
descriptive as well as prescriptive elements. Consequently, it seems that there are some 
limitations in each approach to can capture both risks and benefits of new technologies 
providing an analytical and explanatory policy tool as well as a guideline for policy 
makers.  
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In the remaining part of this paper, I shall try to firstly introduce the case of GM foods 
regulation in the context of the E.U. in comparison with the U.S., which the former is 
in opposite of the central assumptions in the innovation studies, while the latter is 
closer. The trend of changing legislations in both jurisdictions, however, seems in 
opposite of what is emphasized in innovation studies. Then, I shall discuss some 
potential in the co-evolutionary model which can be used for developing an analytic tool 
for policy makers consists of both risks and benefits of technologies, or innovations in 
the next section.  
GM Foods regulation in the context of the U.S. and E.U. 
From the mid-1980’s, the approach of U.S in regulating GM products was based on risk 
assessments (Jasanoff 2000) based on the red book model. They were assuming GM 
organisms are not so novel to need new regulations; whereas products must be considered 
as the unit of risk assessment than processes. It is not possible to judge equally about GM 
products in which each of them needs to be analyzed in a case by case basis (OSTP 1986). 
In most of their case studies, regulators concluded that the risk of GM crops are not so 
different from their non GM counterparts and therefore there is no need for special 
restrictions on them (Jasanoff 1995).  
As a result, until the moment a product wants to be introduced into the market, there is 
no need for any kinds of approval from legislative systems (ibid). Firms are able to do 
laboratory test and research freely before commercialization stage, even they can release 
the GM products at the farm level for experimental purposes. Moreover, risk appraisals 
mainly considered the adverse effects of environmental changes on the farmer’s lands 
commercial prospects, not the non-agricultural environment (House of Lords 2000).  
On the other side of Atlantic, Europe emerged as a different policy regime. The core 
regulatory principle of Europe is choosing precautionary approach4 presumes that GM 
products are inherently different from non-GM products (Levidow and Murphy 2002). 
The term precautionary emphasizes on the scientific unknowns about the effects of 
GMO products (Levidow et al 2000). In the 1990, European Commission published the 
council directive on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified 
organisms (GMO), to provide a set of provisions concerning these products (it is called 
deliberate release directive 90/220). According to this directive, each national authority 
has to take into account appropriate measures to avoid some adverse effects or realizing 
GMOs.  
Contrary to the U.S, which obliged legislative approval just before market introduction 
of GM crops, in the European framework it is necessary to take approval also for 
releasing the seeds into farm level, even for experimental objectives. Moreover, 
consumer’s risk are not deemed a problem in the U.S in which risk assessments are 
                                                 
4 Various studies and papers are about what is the precautionary approach (e.g. Harremoes et al. 2002 
described the instances of using precautionary approaches in the 20th century, though not such explicit; 
or Stirling 1999 discussions to show what is precautionary approach and why it is not in opposite of 
innovation promotion). In short, this view suggests that in the situation of risk in which we have not 
firm scientific basis for decision making, precaution and stage by stage learning is mandatory.  
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concerned with environmental problems (such as biodiversity and so on); while in the 
E.U. risk issues are concerned as a matter of policy attention for both human health and 
environmental issues.  
Another important factor in shaping the trans-Atlantic history of disputes was the 
concept of substantial equivalence which initially accepted in both jurisdictions, but then 
rejected in Europe. Substantial equivalence refers to: “if a new food or food component 
is found to be substantially equivalent to an existing food or food component, it can be 
treated in the same manner with respect to safety. No additional safety concerns would 
be expected” (OECD 1993). In the U.S., firms voluntarily submitted their safety claims, 
including the chemical composition of GM food to show that they are substantially 
equivalent to their non GM counterparts. Europe also accepted a similar notion in its 
Novel Food Regulation 258/97 (another regulation in 1997) accepting the concept of 
substantial equivalence in which firms just required a scientific justification of their claim 
rather than doing real risk assessments in the farm level (Levidow and Morphy 2002).  
Generation and application of this concept provided new opportunity for unifying the 
views in both the U.S. and Europe allowing free trades in a wide range of products and 
services (ibid). The hope of dissolving differences through using this unified approach 
faced sever challenges when the U.S. exports of GM soya in 1997 provoked a 
widespread reaction against retailing and processing of these products (Levidow and 
Carr 2000). In response to these disputes, the Genetic Engineering Alliances asked a 
‘five year freeze’ on all commercial use or patenting these products (GEA 1999) in the 
European context.  
The concept of substantial equivalence was also criticized by different scholars, chief 
among them the critical view of Millstone et al (1999) in the journal of ‘Nature’. Such 
criticism in turn caused a quick reply by OECD in the next issue of ‘Nature’. Debates 
continued until downgrading the concept by E.U in 2001 in its document, the EU stated 
that “this proposal does not include a notification procedure … which are substantially 
equivalent to existing foods” (CEC 2001). On the other side, U.S had more tentative 
changes than E.U, though it abandoned the view that GM products do not present 
unique safety concerns (Levidow and Murphy 2002).  
That old European directive 90/220 was replaced by 2001/18, which widened the 
scope of required risk assessments to extend from direct and short-term effects, also to 
include long-term and indirect ones. This shows that the E.U. is going to extend the 
scopes of its precaution in an era in which the innovation bottle is intensified among 
firms. As a result, while the U.S. market is consuming GM products in a large amount 
and therefore providing a worth opportunity for the firm’s innovations; the market of 
the E.U. is not in favor of those products, deterring and discouraging the GM foods 
innovations.  
Hence, what is important for the E.U. is the safety and security of GMOs than the 
importance of innovation as the central means of economic growth and technological 
progress. The European people did, and are not agree, to consume the products which 
their consequences are unknown and might pose problems for both human’s health and 
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environmental diversity. Intriguingly, on the other side of Atlantic, the human’s health 
is not deemed an area that needs even investigation.  
The precautionary approach of the E.U, can therefore best be understood from the 
perspective of a co-evolutionary model in a dynamic process of interaction between 
science, policy makers and society in a larger socio-political-cultural context. In the 
opposite side, while the U.S. pretend to analyze the risks of new technologies; its red 
book model paves the way for easy legislations in favor of the firm’s demands in 
removing the barriers of market entry.  
In other words, one immediate result of considering framing assumptions in the policy 
making would be increasing the complexity of the process in opposite of the ‘red book’ 
simple suggestion. The red book model presupposes that science is sufficient for risk 
assessments far from social contexts which paves the way for easy and fast legislations in 
favor of firm’s innovations; while this not the case in the transparent model. In the next 
section, I shall provide a theoretical discussion on those frameworks, their limitations 
and a possible approach that can help in providing a more comprehensive analytical tool 
in regulation of technologies.  
Highlighting the policy gap and a suggestion 
The importance of framing assumptions is going to become clear for policy makers in 
the European Countries because some reports (Millstone et al 2004, 2008) are 
emphasizing on the importance of explicitizing those assumptions for preventing further 
struggles and disputes among legislators. The case of the E.U. shows that even in the 
advanced countries which Pavitt (1998) recommended them to consider innovation as 
their high policy priority; there are some cases such as GM foods regulations that does 
not meet this assumption.  
This might be attributed to the fact that these two different strands of studies are 
developed in separation, each of them highlighting a different dimension of the 
technological regulation. On the one hand, the important question of innovation studies 
concerning regulation is how is it possible to find regulatory ways which pose fewer 
barriers on innovations. On the other hand, the literature of risk and governance faced 
an increasing problem of how is it possible to regulate technologies in a way that can 
cope with risks and uncertainties embedded in those technologies.  
Probing from another point of view, it seems that there are serious limitations in the 
innovation studies to illustrate the policy making systems because their theoretical 
insights are developed around firm’s activities as the core player of the innovation 
systems (e.g. Edquist 2005); though they emphasized on considering the role of all 
actors in the innovation systems, particularly the policy making section. On the other 
hand, the literature of risk and governance for its increasing focus on the governance 
system including the public, did not pay enough attention to the firms as the basic place 
of occurring innovations and further benefits to the society.  
 16
The innovation studies are faced with a critical problem of considering the risks and 
uncertainties of new technologies, or innovations, for society. They are mostly based on 
a technocratic assumption that expertise body of governments can deal with regulations 
far from the arguments and needs of the lay public and therefore they did not consider 
the democratization process of regulation as a crucial factor.  
The models developed for regulation of risks and uncertainties, on the other hand, 
mostly focused on how is it possible to handle those problems in the modern societies 
which are called the risk societies (Beck 1992). As a result, in their descriptions and 
prescriptions, the place of considering the benefits of technologies is almost empty. 
Although there are some studies such as Stirling (1999) who argued that the 
precautionary approach of the Europe is not a limit for innovations; it can not provide 
an analytical tool for integrating both aspects of regulation, i.e. risks and benefits.  
Based on the above discussions, I would argue that there are some potentials in the co-
evolutionary model as a general framework, or the transparent model as a more 
specified one, which can shed some lights on the possible ways in developing richer 
conceptual frameworks as well as the more realistic models that can be used for guiding 
political decisions and actions. But it needs some improvements based on the capabilities 
of the innovations studies which have more to do with the benefits than risks of 
technologies.  
The initial theoretical suggestion of this paper would be replacing the term ‘risk’ in 
those models with ‘risks and benefits’ of technologies and innovations. This 
recommendation presupposes that not just arguments and assessments of risks are based 
on some upstream and downstream framing assumptions; but also the propositions in 
favor of technological benefits are framed in a socio-economic context of considerations.  
Therefore, while both arguments of benefits and risks co-exist in political struggles, this 
new model suggests that both of them are based upon some framing assumptions and 
each policy analysis needs to dig up those assumptions in a comparative manner. 
Contrasting the framing assumptions behind both risks and benefits would be very 
helpful for both policy analysis and decisions. On the one hand, it will help to realize 
how various parties frame their arguments differently and on the other hand, it will help 
the decision makers making sense of how much those framing assumptions are plausible 
in comparison to each other. Considering the framing assumptions of risks and benefits 
together, I argue, will lead to sounder and more fruitful political decisions.  
As a guideline, after explicitizing the assumptions, policy makers can contrast the scope 
of those framing assumptions and tune them up. The decision about risks and benefits of 
technologies needs to be taken based on equal framing assumptions as a general rule. 
Policy makers can identify an interesting and plausible framework of framing 
assumptions and ask the opponents and proponents to frame their arguments similarly.  
For instance, one can argue that benefits of GM foods are just economic and physical and 
it has just some direct usefulness; but another one claims the risks of GMOs are not 
confined to physical health, but also include social and political risks for family farms and 
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developing countries (Jasanoff 1995) as well as many indirect effects for flora and fauna. 
Paying no attention to the differences of framing assumptions, at the first instance it 
seems that the risks of those products is more than their benefits; but after considering 
the differences of framing assumptions, it would be clear that those arguments are not 
comparable simply and it needs a similar framing assumption.  
Concluding remarks: 
However, empirical studies need framework for framing assumptions. Some suggestions 
based on Millstone (2006) distinguished between definitional, procedural and 
interpretative framing assumptions, though admitting that they are “interdependent:  
• Substantive risk assessment policy issues are concerned with delineating which 
potential changes and effects are included within the scope of risk assessments 
and which are outside their scope, and which kinds of evidence are admissible 
and which are not.  
• Procedural risk assessment policies are concerned with the processes by which 
risk assessments are conducted.  
• Interpretive risk assessment policy issues are concerned with the ways in 
which data are interpreted. Data and documents do not interpret themselves; 
interpretation often involves judgments and assumptions” (p. 9).   
This framework needs to be enhanced through more empirical studies and field works as 
well as conceptual works. Nevertheless, it seems it may provide a good basis for 
proceeding the research on this theme. Personally, I have selected this distinction and 
classified each item based on other studies as the framework for my research on framing 
assumptions of Iranian policy making system about GM foods. Data gathering in the first 
round will both enhance the suggested framework as well as identify the framing 
assumptions in the system, and the possible contrasts in the framings.   
Conclusion:  
Although there are vast literature and studies concerning the innovation and regulation; 
it seems they are based on one central assumption that in some cases is not true: taking 
for granted the importance of innovation as a supreme way of progress and finding the 
ways in which regulations pose minimum barriers in this way. The case of GM foods 
regulation in the E.U. is an example in which policy makers and the lay public did not 
agree with the innovations in the GM crops and asked a precautionary approach in those 
legislative systems. What is important in this case is coping with risks and uncertainties 
of those products rather than their benefits. However, it does not mean that this is the 
just counterexample; it is possible to mention other cases too. Consequently, the 
approaches and models of innovation studies face with serious limitation in analyzing the 
regulation of those innovations and there is a need for richer conceptual frameworks and 
policy models. What is suggested here after discussing the characteristics of two streams 
of research, means regulation of risks and innovation, is some potentialities in the 
realistic co-evolutionary model of governing risks to can involve also the benefits based 
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on a unified framework of framing assumptions. Nevertheless, this is the first step in 
unifying the models and works of two separate strands and needs much more to can 
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